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Abstract 
This paper discusses macroeconomic and monetary thought at the European Commission in the 1960s. 
It is based on an analysis of public documents, archival research, as well as a large scale programme of 
interviews. The paper starts with an overview of the economic philosophy of the Rome Treaties and 
developments in the 1960s, followed by a presentation of senior macroeconomic policy-makers at the 
Commission. Thereafter, the focus is on three crucial macroeconomic policy documents of the period: 
the project of a European Reserve Fund in 1958, the Commission’s Action Programme for the Second 
Stage of 1962 and the Barre Memorandum of October 1969. The objectives of the Commission were 
both more defensive, preserving the ‘acquis communautaire’, especially avoiding the recourse to the 
safeguard clauses, as pro-active, stimulating the process of European integration. From an analytical 
point of view, the Commission focussed on the linkages and interdependencies between the Member 
States and the compatibility of policies. Gradually, a typical Commission analysis developed, based on 
a blending of German convergence ideas with the French medium-term approach. The paper also 
illustrates the ascension of the Commission as an actor in the monetary area, notwithstanding the 
rather limited provisions of the Rome Treaty. 
Keywords 
-  Macroeconomic and Monetary Thought 
- Policy  Analysis 
- European  Commission 
- Rome  Treaty 
-  European Reserve Fund 
-  Action Programme for the Second Stage 
- Barre  Memorandum EUI-WP RSCAS No. 2004/01 © 2004 Ivo Maes 
Introduction
* 
The creation of the European Economic Community (EEC), in January 1958, has profoundly 
transformed European society during the last decades. During the 1960s the common market, an 
essential element of the Rome Treaties, was to a large extent realised.  
However, in the mid 1950s, the six ‘Schuman’ countries that created the European Coal and Steel 
Community made two very different choices concerning economic integration: a regional one for the 
integration of the goods markets, with the creation of the common market, and a world-wide one for 
monetary integration, with complete external convertibility in the framework of the Bretton-Woods 
system (Abraham & Lemineur-Toumson, 1981). This choice would largely determine the perspective 
through which the Commission would look at monetary issues. For the Commission, monetary 
integration was linked with the integration of the goods markets, wherein agriculture would take a 
special place. This contrasted with the perspective of the central bankers of the Community, for whom 
currency issues were, in first instance, an issue of the international monetary system. 
In this paper the focus is on macroeconomic and monetary thought at the European Commission in 
the 1960s.
1 At the Hague Summit of December 1969 an ambitious programme to deepen European 
integration, including an economic and monetary union, was launched. However, it was, at least 
initially, not very successful (Maes, 2002a). One of the purposes of the paper is to investigate whether 
a study of economic ideas at the European Commission in the 1960s can give some insights to 
understand the failure of Europe's attempt at monetary union in the 1970s. 
A study of economic thought of the policy-making process encounters certain specific problems, 
compared with the study of traditional academic economic texts (Maes, 1996). A crucial difference is 
that the economic theories and paradigms are less explicit, more hidden. Moreover, official documents 
involve many persons and, consequently, are more heterogeneous. Also, official documents are 
usually written with a view to reach certain policy objectives. Any analysis of economic thought and 
the policy-making process will therefore involve a greater degree of ‘rational reconstruction’ than 
more traditional analyses of economic thought. For this, it is also important to get to know the persons 
behind the policy documents. This reconstruction is then also partly based on a large scale programme 
of interviews, giving the paper an ‘oral history’ flavour (cf. Annex 1).  
This paper starts with an overview of the economic philosophy of the Rome Treaties and 
developments in the 1960s, followed by a presentation of the senior macroeconomic policy-makers at 
the Commission. Thereafter, the focus is on three crucial macroeconomic policy documents of the 
period: the project of a European Reserve Fund in 1958, the Commission’s Action Programme for the 
Second Stage of the EEC of 1962 and the Barre Memorandum of October 1969. 
The Rome Treaties: an economic thought perspective 
The Rome Treaties reflected the priorities and sensitivities of the Member States. In the post-war 
period, there were significant differences in ideas and economic policy-making, especially between 
France and Germany (Maes, 2002b). In Germany, the economic order was based on the concept of the 
social market economy, while in France the state played a greater role in economic life and pursued 
                                                      
*   Ivo Maes is Deputy Head of the Research Department of the National Bank of Belgium and professor at the University of 
Leuven and at the ICHEC. Part of the research for this paper was undertaken when the author was a Visiting Fellow, 
Pierre Werner Chair, at the Robert Schuman Centre in September 2003. An earlier version was presented at a seminar at 
the Robert Schuman Centre on 24  September 2003. I am indebted to many persons for useful discussions and 
suggestions, especially J.-P. Abraham, D. Andrews, J. Flory and H. Wallace. The usual restrictions apply. 
1   The focus of the paper is on macroeconomic and monetary issues in a rather narrow sense, e.g. not discussing the issue of 
the liberalisation of capital movements (see Bakker, 1996). Ivo Maes 
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more activist economic policies, with ‘the Plan’ taking a central place. These differences in economic 
ideas were to a large extent based on more fundamental underlying differences in ‘meta-beliefs’. The 
‘tradition républicaine’ in France stressed the sovereign nation as the source of legitimacy and, 
consequently, the political direction of economic policy. The post-war German federal system stressed 
decentralisation and a division of power. The social market economy fitted in with this conception. 
Moreover, after the war, the experiences of France and Germany with the reconstruction were very 
different. In France, the recovery was strongly associated with ‘Le Plan’. In Germany, the recovery, 
‘Das Wirtschaftswunder’ (the economic miracle), was associated with the free market economy. This 
further established and strengthened the different economic paradigms.  
During the Rome Treaty negotiations, the German government was deeply concerned about the 
new European economic system that would be created. One of the main German aims was that the 
European common market would have the same economic order as the one in the Federal Republic, 
based on the principles of a market economy and a liberal trade policy. The Germans feared that 
interactions with more étatist and planified systems, through the common market, could imperil the 
consistency of their own economic system (von der Groeben, 1979: 496). 
The French favoured a greater role for the state in economic life. In a policy memorandum, the 
French government proposed the idea of planning on a European scale:  
A policy of expansion ... implies investment which, in the basic industries, in the chemicals 
industry, in many of the processing industries, rests on a precise conception of the targets to be 
assigned to production over a period of several years. Convergence of the different national 
economic policies can therefore be ensured only by reconciling and harmonising national 
production objectives (as quoted in Marjolin, 1986: 287). 
Moreover, the French government was very concerned that France was not in a position to engage 
in competition on equal terms. It was therefore in favour of harmonisation of legislation which 
affected the competitive position, especially social legislation. The French argued further that 
agriculture had to be included in the common market and that France had extra costs, due to her 
responsibilities in her overseas territories. 
The EEC Treaty was, de facto, of a constitutional order and would transform economic and legal 
rules in the countries of the Community (Padoa-Schioppa, 1998: 9). Looking at the Rome Treaties 
from an economic thought perspective, the European Atomic Energy Community, bears a heavy 
French (planning) imprint, with its sectoral approach, while the European Economic Community, with 
the abolition of barriers which hindered the free movement of goods, services, labour and capital in the 
common market and strong emphasis on competition policy, has a stronger German footing.
2 The 
French obtained the extension of the common market to agriculture and the association of the overseas 
territories. The social chapter was rather limited.  
The EEC Treaty was rather sketchy on macroeconomic and monetary issues, also because of the 
choice for monetary integration in the Bretton-Woods framework. The Treaty left macroeconomic policy-
making mainly at the level of the Member States. The responsibilities of the Commission were limited, 
they concerned mainly the orientation and co-ordination of the national macroeconomic policies.  
In the chapter on ‘Policy relating to economic trends’, Article 103.1 states that ‘Member States shall 
consider their policy relating to economic trends as a matter of common interest. They shall consult with 
each other and with the Commission on measures to be taken in response to current circumstances.’  
The most extensive discussion of macroeconomic and monetary issues is in the chapter ‘Balance of 
Payments’. Article 104 sets out that the Member States should pursue an economic policy ‘to ensure 
equilibrium of its overall balance of payments and to maintain the confidence in its currency, while 
taking care to ensure a high level of employment and a stable level of prices’. Furthermore, it states 
that ‘Member States shall co-ordinate their economic policies’ (Article 105.1) and ‘Each Member 
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State shall treat its policy with regard to exchange rates as a matter of common interest’ 
(Article  107.1). The Treaty also foresaw in the establishment of the Monetary Committee, which 
would become very influential. 
Article 108 discusses the situation when a Member State would have serious balance of payments 
difficulties which could threaten the functioning of the common market. It stipulates that the 
Commission would investigate the situation and that the Commission can recommend measures for the 
Member State to take. Moreover, the article foresees in the possibility of the granting of ‘mutual 
assistance’. Article 109 contains the famous safeguard clauses, on which France insisted on, that a Member 
State in case of a sudden balance of payments crisis can take the ‘necessary protective measures’. 
The relative lack of attention for monetary issues in the Rome Treaty can been explained from 
several perspectives (Pierre-Brossolette, 2002:  100). First, money and monetary policy were 
considered as important elements of national sovereignty. Therefore, the negotiators were reluctant to 
tackle these issues so short after the failure of the initiative for a ‘European Defence Community’. 
Second, there was a reluctance in France against a too pronounced integration with Germany, given ‘la 
trop grande proximité de certains souvenirs’. Third, in the mid 1950s, there were important 
divergencies in economic and monetary policies between the countries of the EEC. All in all, the 
Rome Treaty already seemed very ambitious.  
The European Community in the 1960s 
During most of the 1960s, the Bretton-Woods system provided the European Economic Community 
with a favourable international monetary environment. Stable exchange rates, both between the 
countries of the European Community and with other countries, facilitated the integration process. 
However, academic discussions about the future of the international monetary system had already 
started, with Friedman’s (1953) influential plaidoyer for flexible exchange rates and Triffin’s (1960) 
analysis of the flaws of the Bretton-Woods System.  
The ‘Golden Sixties’ were a period of strong economic growth (cf. Chart 1). In the European 
Economic Community, a virtuous dynamic developed: the abolition of barriers to trade, with the 
creation of the EEC, strengthened economic growth, which in turn made it easier to accelerate the 
common market programme.  
For policy-makers at the Commission macroeconomic imbalances, especially inflation differentials 
between countries, were a major concern. Three episodes were critical: 
•  At the start of the Community, there were major macroeconomic imbalances in France. Inflation, 
in 1958, amounted to more than 10%. This was a serious problem for pro-Europeans in France: 
how could France participate in the common market project with this kind of macroeconomic 
imbalances? 
•  In 1962 and 1963 the inflation differential between France and Germany increased again. This 
time, a major factor was the revaluation of the German mark with 5% in March 1961. 
•  At the end of the 1960s, inflationary tendencies developed. This was especially so in France after 
the student and social upheavals of May 1968, leading to strong attacks on the French franc. The 
Banque de France had to intervene on the foreign exchange markets and increase interest rates. 
In August 1969 the French franc was devalued with 11.1 pct.  Ivo Maes 
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Chart 1 - Gross Domestic Product at Constant Prices
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Chart 2 - Price Deflator of Private Consumption
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Senior Macroeconomic Policy-Makers at the Commission 
It is the College of the Commission which is ultimately responsible for policy-making at the European 
Commission.
3 However, as macroeconomic policy-making was mainly at the level of the Member States, 
the powers of the Commission were rather limited and concerned mainly the coordination of policies. 
The first organigramme of the Services of the Commission is remarkably simple and reflects very 
well the structure of the EEC Treaty (cf. Table 1). The services of the Commission were initially 
composed of nine directorate-generals (departments), giving a good overview of the activities of the 
EEC. These were External Relations, Economic and Financial Affairs (the macroeconomic research 
department), Internal Market, Competition, Social Affairs, Agriculture, Transport, Overseas Countries 
and Territories, and Administration. There was also the powerful Secretariat (with, e.g., responsibility 
for the co-ordination of activities and the preparation of the meetings of the Commission). 
In the attribution of the responsibilities of the members of the Commission and the director-
generals (the highest civil servants) one can observe the preoccupations and sensitivities of France and 
Germany. Louis Armand, a Frenchman, was the first president of the Commission of the EAEC. 
Walter Hallstein, a German, was the first president of the Commission of the EEC, while the 
Secretary-General, Emile Noël, was French.
4 
There was also a Franco-German balance in economic policy attributions. The Germans had the 
important portfolio of competition policy, with Hans von der Groeben. The French had the lead in 
macroeconomic policy, as Robert Marjolin became responsible for Economic and Financial Affairs. 
These assignments reflected, in part, national concerns 
The Germans further secured their presence in external relations with the director-generals for 
External Relations and Overseas Countries and Territories (Seeliger and Allardt).
5 Moreover, they 
were pleased with Belgium’s Jean Rey at foreign relations. As von der Groeben (1998: 106) later 
remarked, ‘we could more readily expect him, a liberal politician, to have an appreciation of a 
worldwide and liberal trade policy’. 
                                                      
3    In the EEC terminology, the term ‘Commission’ is used both for the College of the Commission, the body of 
commissioners, and for the services of the Commission, the administration. 
4   Formerly, Noël had been the chef de cabinet of Mollet, the French prime minister. 
5   In 1960 Allardt resigned (or had to resign) because of disagreements with regard to the preferential regime for the 
overseas territories (Lemaignen, 1964: 146). Macroeconomic and Monetary Thought at the European Commission in the 1960s 
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Table 1 - The First Commission of the European Economic Community 
Responsibility 
Member of the 
Commission 
Director-General 
Presidency (Secretariat - General)  Hallstein (D)
  Noël (F) 
Economic and Financial Affairs  Marjolin
1 (F)  Bobba (I) 
Competition  von der Groeben (D)  Verloren van Themaat (N) 
Internal Market  Malvestiti
1 (I)  Ortoli (F) 
Agriculture Mansholt
1 (N)  Rabot (F) 
Overseas Countries and Territories  Lemaignen (F)  Allardt (D) 
External Affairs  Rey (B)  Seeliger (D) 
Social Affairs  Petrilli (I)  de Muyinck (B) 
Transport  Rasquin (L)  Renzetti (I) 
1 Vice-President. 
The French also obtained key positions in areas that were sensitive. Lemaignen became the 
member of the Commission responsible for Overseas Countries and Territories, while François-Xavier 
Ortoli and Jacques Rabot became director-general for, respectively, Internal Market and Agriculture.
6 
The French were also quite happy with Sicco Mansholt as the member of the Commission responsible 
for agriculture: he had been a Dutch Minister for agriculture for many years, knew perfectly the 
mechanics of the farm sector and was convinced of the need for a common European agricultural 
policy (Marjolin, 1986: 313). 
Moreover, the Commission functioned with Groups of Commissioners for the different areas. In 
the Hallstein Commission (1958), the Group of Economic and Financial Affairs was presided by 
Marjolin. The other members were Hans von der Groeben (vice-president), Piero Malvestiti and Sicco 
Mansholt. In the Rey Commission (1967), the Group of Economic and Financial Affairs consisted of 
Fritz Hellwig (vice-president), Sicco Mansholt, Lionello Levi Sandri, Albert Coppé, Guido Colonna di 
Paliano and Wilhelm Haferkamp.
7 
Within the Commission then the French had the lead in macroeconomic policy, firstly with Robert 
Marjolin and later with Raymond Barre as the members responsible for the Directorate-General of 
Economic and Financial Affairs (DGII, which can be considered as the macroeconomic research 
department of the Commission, cf. Table 2). Robert Marjolin and Raymond Barre were both very 
prominent French economists. Their impact on policy-making at the Commission was even more 
important as the Commission administration was quite small at that time. 
Marjolin is considered as one of the few prominent ‘Keynesian’ economists in France, developing 
in his doctoral dissertation a long-run dynamic theory (Arena and Schmidt, 1999: 93). He became later 
the deputy of Jean Monnet at the French Planning Office and the first Secretary-General of the OEEC. 
                                                      
6   Naturally, the appointments at the level of the Commission and director-general reflect many other equilibria. So was 
Marjolin considered as a socialist, while Lemaignen had been the vice-president of the French employers federation (with 
a long African experience). As regards the Belgians, Rey was a liberal politician and de Muyinck a trade-unionist. 
7   It is the College of the Commission which is ultimately responsible, as a whole, for policy-making at the Commission. Ivo Maes 
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Also during his time at the Commission he was very much interested in economic programming.
8 
Raymond Barre was quite professorial, with a wide knowledge of economic theory.
9He was free 
market-oriented, and very much a man of ‘economic discipline’, convinced of the importance of stable 
prices and exchange rates. He also had policy experience, as the chef de cabinet of Jean-Marcel 
Jeanneney, De Gaulle’s Minister of Industry, where he had been supervising the abolition of tariffs 
and quotas, as required by the Rome Treaty. From a political perspective, was Marjolin close to 
Monnet and more in favour of supranationalist European institutions, while Barre, at that time, was 
close to the Gaullists. As one commentator observed, ‘With M. Barre, the Commission for the first 
time adopted the ‘realist’ or ‘pragmatic’ standpoint in contrast with the ‘utopian’ views of those 
calling for a quick progress towards monetary union’ (Tsoukalis, 1977: 72). 




1  Rey Commission
2 
Member responsible for DG II 
(Economic and Financial Affairs)  R. Marjolin (F)  R. Barre (F) 
Chef de cabinet  J. Flory
3 (F)  J.-C. Paye (F) 




-  National economies and 
business cycle 
 
P. Millet (F)  B. Molitor (D) 
- Monetary  matters 
 
L. Gleske (D)  F. Boyer de la Giroday (F) 
-  Structure and development 
 
L. Duquesne de la Vinelle (B)  M. Albert (F) 
- Budgetary  matters
4 _  G. Wissels (N) 
Secretary of the Monetary 
Committee 
 
A. Prate (F)  R. de Kergorlay (F) 
1 End 1959. 
2 September 1967. 
3 From 1963 to 1968 
4 Created in 1967. 
At the level of the administration, the Director-generals of DGII have typically been Italians.
10 The 
first one, Franco Bobba, was a former diplomat, a senior official at the economic directorate of the 
Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and one of the negotiators of the Rome Treaty. He was succeeded 
by Ugo Mosca, also a former diplomat. 
                                                      
8  According to an interviewee, did Monnet and Marjolin not really capture the idea of the market, but was economics for 
them a question of steering from above. 
9   For instance, Barre wrote a review of Walter Eucken's Foundations of Economics (Barre, 1952). 
10  Von der Groeben argued in favour of a German Director-general. However, Hallstein preferred German Director-generals 
in the external DGs (see van der Groeben, 1995: 302). Macroeconomic and Monetary Thought at the European Commission in the 1960s 
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Initially, DGII consisted of three directorates, reflecting the main preoccupations of 
macroeconomic policy-makers at the Commission. The French were well represented at the Director’s 
level. A first directorate, ‘National economies and business cycle’, was responsible for the follow-up 
of the economic situation and the evolution of the business cycle in Community. The first director was 
Pierre Millet (F). At the end of the 1960s, Bernhard Molitor (D), later a senior official in the German 
Economics Ministry, became the Director. The second directorate was ‘Monetary matters’, with first 
Leonhard Gleske (D) as director, later a member of the Direktorium of the Bundesbank. In the mid 
1960s, Frédéric Boyer  de  la  Giroday (F) became the monetary director. The third directorate was 
‘Structure and development’. It had in many ways, e.g. medium term forecasts, sectoral analyses, and 
structural programmes, a close resemblance to the (French) Planning Office. Its first director was 
Louis Duquesne de la Vinelle (B). Michel Albert (F), later Secretary-general of the French Planning 
Office, became the Director at the end of the 1960s. In 1967 a directorate for ‘Budgetary matters’ was 
created by Barre, with Gerard Wissels (N) as director. Another influential person was the Secretary of 
the Monetary Committee, a position which was at the same level as a directorship. The first Secretary 
was Alain Prate (F), who later became an economic adviser to De Gaulle and a Vice-Governor of the 
Banque de France. He was succeeded by Roland de Kergorlay (F). 
It is noteworthy that, in 1958, at the start of the Communities, most of the crucial positions for the 
application of the safeguard clauses were occupied by French persons. The economic situation would be 
discussed in the Monetary Committee, of which Alain Prate was the Secretary. The basic paper would be 
provided by the Directorate National economies and business cycles (Millet) of DG II, for which Marjolin 
was responsible. Moreover, the Director-General for the Internal Market was Ortoli. Prate tells about the 
meeting in which Marjolin asked him to become the Secretary of the Monetary Committee: 
La France se trouve dans l'incapacité de mener la poitique permettant d’ouvrir ses frontalières. Le 
recours aux clauses de sauvegarde est inévitable; il faut donc s’y préparer dès maintenant. Le traité 
prévoyant l'intervention du Comité monétaire, il faut constituer dès que possible ce comité et le mettre 
au travail’. Robert Marjolin, devançant l'événement, pouvait difficilement accepter que la France se 
dispensât purement et simplement de respecter ses engagements et il entendait faire jouer le dispositif 
institutionnel du traité pour inviter le gouvernement français à modifier sa politique économique 
(Prate, 1991: 78, original quotation marks). 
Very influential at the Commission was also Robert Triffin, officially an advisor, and very close to 
Marjolin. A flavour of Triffin’s ideas can be found in his book Europe and the Money Muddle, 
published in the spring of 1957, before the ratification of the Rome Treaties. Triffin then already urged 
the (future) EEC-members to go ahead and aim at the realisation of a monetary union. Furthermore he 
argued that: 
Monetary unification would not require, in any manner, a full unification of national levels of 
prices, costs, wages, productivity, or living standards. [...] Neither does monetary unification 
require a uniformization of the budgetary economic, or social policies of the member countries. 
[...] The problem of monetary unification is therefore a political rather than an economic problem 
(Triffin, 1957: 228-229).  
Marjolin and Triffin had both been very much involved in the European Payments Union. They 
shared a certain nostalgia for the framework of policy coordination and surveillance of the European 
Payments Union.
11  
The Project of a ‘European Reserve Fund’ 
Monnet became interested in European monetary integration in the second half of the 1950s. It was a 
consequence of the French economic and financial crisis at that time, which threatened France’s 
                                                      
11  The European Payments Union was established between the OEEC countries. The aim of the agreement was to promote 
free trade by a multilatered clearing of payments between the member countries. This was complemented by a framework 
of policy coordination and surveillance. It functioned from 1 July 1950 to 27 December 1958. Ivo Maes 
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participation in the common market project (Perron, 2001). Typically, he put the French problem in a 
European framework and turned to his network for technical advice. That advice came from Pierre 
Uri, Paul Delouvrier, Robert Marjolin, and, above all, from Robert Triffin (Duchêne, 1994). 
The project of a European Reserve Fund was one of Robert Triffin’s most important topics of 
analysis during his time as an advisor at the European commission. In the autumn of 1957, Triffin 
reformulated his earlier ideas for a European Reserve Fund in an EEC framework (Maes and Buyst, 
2002). It was discussed at DG II and Marjolin, in November 1958, presented a Memorandum to the 
Commission on the subject (see Annexes 4 to 8 in Ferrant & Sloover, 1990).
12 
Marjolin started from the observation that the Rome Treaty provided for the basic principles of the 
coordination of economic policies, but that the elaboration of this coordination was not very well 
worked out. To realise the ambitions of the Treaty, he argued that a common economic policy was 
appropriate. So could one avoid important divergencies of inflation and employment, which would 
lead to balance of payments difficulties and the application of the safeguard clauses. 
To put in practice the coordination of policies, Marjolin proposed to undertake regular surveys of 
the economies of the Member States, in which the main economic and financial policy issues would be 
discussed. Moreover, he proposed that the Community institutions could also formulate policy 
recommendations.
13 The weight of these recommendations would be stronger if the Community would 
also dispose of financial resources to facilitate the organisation of financial solidarity. A European 
Reserve Fund could fulfil this role.  
This European Reserve Fund could be constituted by pooling 10% of the international reserves of 
the Member States’ central banks. The Fund would provide for different type of credits both for 
countries with Balance of payments difficulties as to support economic growth. Marjolin also 
proposed that the accounts of the Fund would be expressed in a new unit of account. 
The proposals also gave a key role to the Commission in the macroeconomic and monetary area, as 
it would have a lead role in the coordination of policies. A member of the Commission would also be 
on the Executive Board (‘Comité de Direction’) of the European Reserve Fund. 
However, the proposal did not take off.
14 In December 1958, De Gaulle devalued the French franc 
and followed orthodox economic policies, re-establishing economic stability in France. Moreover, also 
in December 1958, the countries of the Community restored the external convertibility of their 
currencies in the framework of the Bretton-Woods system. 
The Commission’s Action Programme of October 1962 
In October 1962 the Commission submitted a Memorandum which contained its Action Programme 
for the second stage of the European Economic Community (1962-1965). Walter Hallstein, the 
president of the Commission, drafted the political introduction, while all members of the Commission, 
each for his own area of responsibility, took part in the preparation of the programme.
15 
In the 1962 Memorandum the Commission pushed for a maximal interpretation of the Rome Treaty 
as implying the progressive realization of full economic and monetary union and political union. 
Moreover, Marjolin advocated the idea of a medium-term policy for the Community. 
                                                      
12   In a Memorandum of 31  May 1958, Marjolin was more cautious, proposing a system of ‘stand-by’ credits, not a 
European Reserve Fund (Archives Triffin). 
13  Surveillance and policy recommendations had also been part of the EPU framework.  
14  It is not clear to me what happened exactly with the proposal. Further archival work might shed some light on this. 
15  See also Hallstein 1961 and 1972.  Macroeconomic and Monetary Thought at the European Commission in the 1960s 
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The introduction very strongly stated the political character of European economic integration, 
which should lead to a complete merger of the economies of the six Member States in a complete 
economic union: 
L’intégration dite économique de l'Europe est, dans son essence, un phénomène politique. La 
Communauté économique européenne constitue avec la Communauté européenne du Charbon et de 
l’Acier et la Communauté européenne de l'énergie atomique une union politique dans les domaines 
économiques et social. Conformément à la volonté des Parties Contractantes de s’engager dans une 
intégration complète et compte tenu des conditions économiques que déterminent la création d'un 
espace économique unifié, le Traité a prévu la fusion des économies des six Etats membres en une 
union économique totale. Dans cette perspective d'ensemble, il importe de distinguer, d'une part l'union 
douanière et, d'autre part, l'union économique—au sens étroit du terme—qui se complètent et se 
commandent mutuellement. (Commission, 1962a: 1).
16 
Economic union implied the progressive merger of national economic policies in a common short-
term and long-term economic policy. This further implied the fixation, by the Community, of long-
term economic objectives.
17 
The chapter on competition policy (the area of von der Groeben) clearly reflected German ordo-
liberal ideas. It emphasised that competition was essential for the orientation of economic activity. 
Moreover, it went further, linking the economic and political regime: ‘L’ordre économique doit en 
outre garantir la réalisation du plus haut degré de liberté personnelle à tous ceux qui participent à la vie 
économique et sociale’ (Commission, 1962a: 24). 
In the chapter on economic policy (the area of Marjolin), there was not only a plaidoyer for ‘une 
politique conjoncturelle communautaire’ (p.  72), but also for a medium-term policy, ‘une 
programmation’, at the level of the Community (p. 74).
18 Several arguments were advanced for such a 
‘programmation’ at the Community level: 
•  to enlighten national and Community decisions for which the effect is only discernible after a 
certain time lag;  
•  an indispensable instrument for a rational redistribution of the limited financial resources of the 
Government;  
•  a necessary guide for national plans and programmes, as the growing openness of the economies 
increases the uncertainty for national actions; 
•  a framework for Community policies for agriculture, transport and energy; 
•  to support structural adjustments, especially regional development and industrial reconversion; 
•  to support an incomes policy. 
The Memorandum argued that programming would not go against competition policy, but would 
rather reinforce competition in the Community. The Memorandum further proposed that a 
‘consolidated programme’ be established for the period 1964-1968. This programme would define: 
•  desirable and possible evolution of economic activity; 
•  long-term projections for government revenues and expenditures; 
•  the expected or desired distribution of gross domestic product between the main sectors of activity; 
•  a forecast of labour supply and demand; 
                                                      
16  According to von der Goeben (1995: 339) was Marjolin reluctant about this formulation as he feared problems, especially 
with the French government. 
17  The ‘programmation communautaire’ figured also very prominently in an article in the Bulletin of the EEC (Commission, 
1962b) which provided an overview of the Action Programme. 
18   In June  1962 the Commission published a report by a group of experts, chaired by Pierre Uri, on the economic 
perspectives for the EEC from 1960 to 1970 (CEC, 1962c). Ivo Maes 
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•  a forecast of how the volume of investment, corresponding to the needs of the Community, 
could be financed; 
•  the projected evolution of the external balance of the Community. 
The Memorandum also argued that ‘les grandes forces économiques’ of the Community should be 
consulted in the development of these plans and projections. 
Marjolin had been personally involved in the preparations to organise ‘programmation’ on the level 
of the Community. The Commission also organised a colloquium in Rome in November 1962 to 
discuss these ideas (see Marjolin, 1963 and Morel, 1978). 
In the chapter on monetary policy, also an area of Marjolin, it was argued that monetary union 
could become the objective of the third stage of the common market (1966-1969).
19 The Memorandum 
argued that monetary policy had a ‘vital importance’ for the Common Market, as exchange rate upheavals 
could disrupt trade flows. The Memorandum paid in this respect special attention to agriculture: 
Mais la politique monétaire a une importance vitale pour le Marché Commun d'un autre point de 
vue. L'union économique implique, en effet, au moins après la fin de la période de transition, la 
fixité des taux de change des monnaies des Etats membres, sous réserve de variations dans des 
limites très étroites. Toute modification importante provoquerait des bouleversements si profonds 
dans les échanges de pays que ne protégera plus aucune barrière douanière et entraînerait, à 
raison du prix d'intervention communautaire garanti pour les céréales et pour d'autres produits 
agricoles de base, des changements si soudains dans le niveau des prix des produits agricoles et 
par conséquent dans les revenus des agriculteurs que le Marché Commun lui-même pourrait être 
mis en cause (Commission, 1962a : 87). 
Monetary union was then not only a way forward for the Community (cf. Andrews, 2002). It was 
considered as necessary to protect the Common Agricultural Policy, a ‘single market’ (with common 
prices!) for agricultural products from exchange rate upheavals. The German revaluation of March 
1961 had in this respect an important influence on policy-makers at the Commission, as it showed the 
vulnerability of the international monetary system (Gleske, 2001: 147). 
For the second stage (1962-1965), the Memorandum proposed ‘prior consultation’ for all important 
monetary policy decisions, like changes in the discount rate, minimum reserve ratios, central bank 
credits to the State, changes in exchange rates, etc. 
It is perhaps surprising that such an ambitious program did not contain the project of a European 
Reserve Fund of just a few years earlier. However, the ‘logic’ of the Memorandum and of the proposal 
for a European Reserve Fund are rather different. The Memorandum started from the common market 
and the common agricultural policy (with common prices) and explored the implications of those. It 
concluded that fixed exchange rates, and thus a monetary union, was an inevitable consequence of the 
common market and common agricultural prices.
20 This rather contrasts with the project of a European 
Reserve Fund, which is much more ‘voluntarist’. 
The Commission Memorandum did not receive a favourable welcome everywhere. In Germany, 
the Frankfurter Allgemeine had an article with as title ‘Gefährlicher Brückenkopf für neuen 
Dirigismus’ (‘Dangerous bridgehead for a new dirigisme’). Erhard criticised the Memorandum in the 
European Parliament. The List Society organised a three day conference in June 1963 with the theme 
‘Planung ohne Planwirtschaft’ (‘Planning without a plan economy’, Plitzko, 1964). Among the 
participants were Walter Hallstein and Hans von der Groeben, Alfred Müller-Armack, the State 
                                                      
19  Monetary union is not mentioned in the introduction of the Memorandum, but it figured in the article in the Bulletin of 
the EEC (Commission, 1962b). The chapter had been prepared in DGII, see the paper by Gleske ‘Die Währungs- und 
Finanzpolitk im Gemeinsamen Markt’, Juni/Juli 1962, and Triffin's remarks (Archives Gleske).  
20    In a note to Hallstein of 11  September 1962, Meyer, the deputy head of cabinet of Hallstein, argued that ‘Die 
gemeinsame Agrarpolitik ist heute fest genug verwurzelt, als dass diese Einsicht in ihre währungspolitischen 
Konsequenzen zu Schwierigkeiten führen könnten’ (Archives Gleske). Macroeconomic and Monetary Thought at the European Commission in the 1960s 
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Secretary of the German Economics Ministry, and prominent foreign economists as Oskar 
Morgenstern and Jan Tinbergen. Also De Gaulle tended to oppose quantitative targets, as they would 
limit national policy-making autonomy (Howarth, 2001: 24). 
The Governors of the central banks of Germany, Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands also 
discussed the Commission Memorandum. They came out in favour of new progress in monetary 
cooperation between the Member States of the Community and the creation of a Council of Central 
Bank Governors. However, they remarked that monetary coordination was also desirable in a wider 
framework than that of the Community and that it could only be efficient if there was also a 
coordination of budgetary policy. Moreover, several issues, like the reform of the international 
monetary system, mutual assistance and monetary union, according to the Governors, first had to be 
discussed at the level of each Member State (‘Note’ of 10 December 1962, Archives ECB).
21 
The discussions led to adjustments in the proposals of the Commission. On July 26, 1963 the 
Commission submitted a Recommendation to the Council, concerning the ‘Medium-Term Economic 
Policy of the Community’ (CEC, 1963b). In this Recommendation the Commission first stressed the 
role of the market as the most effective instrument to ensure the best use of available resources and the 
need to maintain and strengthen competition. The Recommendation further argues that the state plays 
a decisive role in economic life, thus ‘It seems therefore to become more and more necessary that an 
overall view be taken, in terms of several years of coming economic development, so that state action 
can be made to fit into a coherent framework and will neither be inconsistent in itself nor upset the 
free play of the market except in so far as this is essential and expressly agreed to by all authorities 
concerned’ (CEC, 1963b: 14). Herefore, two distinct operations had to be carried out: the preparation 
of economic prospect studies and the elaboration of a medium-term economic programme. Lest the 
projections be considered growth targets, the Commission proposed that they would be elaborated by 
independent experts; on the basis of these forecasts, the authorities of the Member States and the 
Community could work out a common medium-term economic programme. To facilitate the 
elaboration of this programme and to assist the coordination of medium-term economic policies, an 
advisory body, the ‘Medium-Term Economic Policy Committee’, would be created. It would provide a 
stimulus for medium-term analysis at the Commission. 
On 24 June 1963, the Commission also submitted a Communication on ‘Monetary and Financial 
Cooperation in the European Economic Community’ (CEC, 1963a). The Commission there proposed 
the creation of two new consultative organs, the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks of the 
Member States of the European Economic Community and the Budgetary Policy Committee, as well 
as to increase the responsibilities of the Monetary Committee, especially in the area of international 
monetary matters. Furthermore, there was a draft decision relating to prior consultations between 
Member States in the event of changes in the parity of their currencies.
22 
While the decisions of 1963 were a far cry from monetary union, as had been proposed in the 1962 
Commission Memorandum, they contributed to establishing the Commission as an actor in the 
monetary area. Firstly, they made it clear that the Rome Treaty gave a right of initiative to the 
Commission in the monetary area. Secondly, the Commission would, as an observer, be invited to the 
meetings of the Committee of Governors. This would give the Commission an entrance in the world of 
the central bankers.
23 During the first meetings of the Committee of Governors, Marjolin took the 
opportunity to present the ideas of the Commission:  
                                                      
21   The Governors also asked for a legal analysis whether the Council and the Commission had the right to establish 
regulations and directives and to take binding decisions for the central banks (La Politique Monétaire dans le cadre du 
Marché Commun, 4/12/62, Archives ECB).  
22  The Commission referred to the 4th annual report of the Monetary Committee, in which it was noted that the currency 
revaluations of 1961 had ‘not been proceeded by adequate coordination at Community level’ (CEC, 1962a: 37). 
23  Something not unimportant. So became Delors, through his participation at the meetings of the Committee of Governors, 
convinced that the central bank Governors had to be in the ‘Delors Committee’. Ivo Maes 
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Mais la question principale, continue M. Marjolin, s’identifie avec le mouvement vers la création 
d'une union monétaire. On dit qu'une union monétaire n’est pas possible sans une union politique. 
Cela est vrai, mais si on avait parlé, il y a huit ou dix ans, d'unifier les prix des produits agricoles, 
tout le monde aurait dit qu’il s’agissait d'un projet irréalisable; il faut songer que même sans 
union politique la Communauté a réalisé, dans une large mesure, l'union économique.  
  La Commission de la CEE est maintenant décidée à faire des propositions au Conseil des 
Ministres, propositions qui tendront à nous approcher de l’union monétaire, et M. Marjolin est 
autorisé à solliciter des avis, des conseil, etc., même si négatifs, soit au Comité des Gouverneurs, 
soit au Comité monétaire, sur les progrès réalisables, sur les obstacles à éliminer, sur les moyens 
les plus recommandables pour atteindre un tel but (Minutes of the 2nd Meeting of the Committee 
of Governors, 12/10/64, Archives ECB). 
In his Memoirs, Marjolin comments somewhat strangely on this episode (see also Andrews, 2002):  
It was in 1964, too, that the first attempt was made, if not to create an economic union, at least to 
co-ordinate national economic policies. I was personally responsible here, since economic, 
financial and monetary questions were my domain ... It was at that time that I started to have 
doubts about the possibility and perhaps even the utility, as a rule, of co-ordinating national 
economic policies. Either governments act spontaneously, guided by their own interest, or they are 
too weak to act, in both of which cases no amount of external pressure will be able to budge them. 
Nevertheless, in that same year of 1964 the Council, on my proposal, established a Committee of 
Governors of Central Banks and a Committee on Budgetary Policy, while the functions of the 
Monetary Committee were augmented. At the same time the Council decided to draw up and 
implement a medium-term economic policy. The latter remained largely a dead letter. As for the new 
committees, although they did useful work and brought together for the discussion of Community 
business national government officials who, for the most part, had not known one another previously, 
they did not, at least at the time, do much to further the harmonisation, not to mention the unification, of 
national economic policies. It has to be said that the need for this had not yet made itself felt acutely 
(Marjolin, 1986: 346-347). 
The Barre Memorandum 
In the second half of the 1960s the international monetary situation further deteriorated. The 
Commission became worried that, if the countries of the Community would not take a common 
position, the Community risked falling apart (Minutes of the 23th Meeting of the Committee of 
Governors, 12  February 1968, Archives ECB). The Commission worked out a (confidential) 
Memorandum which it presented to the Council in February 1968. 
The main aim of this ‘Memorandum sur l'Action de la Communauté dans le Domaine Monétaire’ 
(Archives Wissels) was to establish closer monetary relations between the countries of the 
Community. It was proposed that: 
•  Member States should declare that exchange rates would be adjusted only with mutual prior consent. 
•  The fluctuation margins should be eliminated. 
•  A system of mutual assistance should be established. 
•  A single European unit of account should be established. 
Furthermore, concerted action in the international monetary institutions was envisaged.  
The Memorandum was very short (two pages) and the proposals were not elaborated. They were 
very much in line with the voluntarist ideas which Triffin and Boyer were defending in DG II.
24 They 
were also quite in line with certain French ideas, in favour of a ‘European monetary identity’, but 
without new supranational institutions (de Lattre, 1999). 
                                                      
24  In August 1967, Boyer was elaborating proposals, based on the ‘Triffin Treasury of smart ideas’, Letter of Boyer to 
Triffin, 2/8/67, Archives Triffin. Macroeconomic and Monetary Thought at the European Commission in the 1960s 
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The Commission proposals were criticised by Germany and the Netherlands, who argued that such 
a ‘one-sided monetary approach made no sense’ (Szász, 1999: 11). The events of May 1968 and the 
ensuing crisis around the French franc, in which France invoked the safeguard clauses, further left 
their imprint.
25 
In October 1968, Raymond Barre was quite sceptical about EMU and defended quite ‘economist’ 
positions. He declared in the European Parliament that for EMU to succeed a European political authority 
was needed (Barre, 1968: 17). He further argued that monetary union would be the ‘crowning act’ of 
economic union. Barre went for a more pragmatic and two-sided approach, arguing that the main objective 
had to be better coordination of both the economic and monetary policies of the Member States.
26 The 
monetary proposals were less ambitious than in the February 1968 Memorandum. So was there no mention 
any more of the establishment of a single European unit of account.
27 
These ideas were further developed in the so-called ‘Barre’ Memorandum of February 1969 
(Commission of the EEC, 1969). The Barre Memorandum started from the observation that the 
Community was ‘une entité économique originale et complexe’, composed of both national and 
Community elements. It underlined the growing economic interdependence between the Member 
States, implying that an incompatibility of policies and strategies could endanger the customs union. 
The Barre Memorandum then focused on three main lines of action:  
a) convergence of medium-term economic policy orientations. The Barre Memorandum proposed to 
better specify the degree of convergence of the broad orientations of medium-term policy of the 
Member States and to assure their reciprocal compatibility. In the Commission analysis, there thus 
occurred a blending of the French medium-term approach with the German convergence analysis. The 
main objectives of these medium-term policies concerned economic growth, the evolution of prices and 
the situation of the balance of payments. 
b) the coordination of short-term economic policies. Here the emphasis was on sufficiently coherent 
short-term policies, at the level of the Community, so that the evolution of the different economies did 
not diverge from the medium-term objectives. The Memorandum proposed a reinforcement and a more 
effective application of the consultation procedures, before Member States decide on economic policies. 
The Memorandum also proposed a system of ‘early warning’ indicators. 
c) a Community mechanism for monetary cooperation. The proposed Community mechanism for 
monetary cooperation had to be composed of two parts: one for short-term monetary support and 
one for medium-term financial assistance. 
Compared with the 1962 Action Programme, the Barre Memorandum is clearly much more modest 
and pragmatic. This is not surprising giving the lack of political will, especially but not only in the 
France of de Gaulle, and the increasing divergencies of national economic situations, especially with 
regard to inflation and the balance of payments. 
The Barre Memorandum is also characterised by a special mixture of traditional German and 
French ideas. This is most clear in the first part of the Memorandum, on ‘Convergence of medium-
term economic policy orientations’. Here the French inspired medium-term analysis is applied to the 
German notion of economic convergence. By doing so, it signalled heightened concern at the 
                                                      
25  Barre was one of the persons who played a key role in convincing De Gaulle that it was possible to avoid a devaluation of 
the French franc. 
26  Barre (2000: 19) mentions that it was in Brussels that he got to know the differences between the approaches of the 
French administration (‘sens aigu de l'interventionnisme, appuyé sur une certaine méconnaissance du marché’ and 
‘formellement ou informellement protectionniste’) and the German one. 
27  A typical Triffin idea. It is noteworthy that Boyer, in 1967, quotes a close collaborator of Barre that Triffin was a good 
friend of Barre (Letter of Boyer to Triffin, 2/8/67, Archives Triffin). However, at least from mid 1968, the ideas of Triffin 
and Barre on European monetary integration seem to have been quite different.  Ivo Maes 
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Commission concerning the disparities in prices and costs in the countries of the Community (Note 
SEC(68) 3958 of 5/12/68, p. 11, Archives NBB).
28 
The Commission’s ideas for closer monetary cooperation between the countries of the Community 
drew initially quite mixed reactions from the central bank governors. At their meeting of December 
1968, Carli, while admitting the political nature of the issue, stated that he was ‘perplexe’ at the 
possibility of closer monetary cooperation at the level of the Community. He argued that the 
Community covered rather too small an area. Moreover, the Community constituted only a customs 
union and not an economic and political union (Minutes of the 27th Meeting of the Committee of 
Governors, 9/12/68, Archives ECB). Blessing and Zylstra agreed with him, while Brunet and Ansiaux 
took more subtle positions.  
In their meeting of March 1969, the Governors stressed that the coordination of economic policies was 
the most important issue. After a thorough discussion, Ansiaux concluded that a mechanism for monetary 
cooperation ‘a des justifications plus politiques qu’économiques et qu’à ce point de vue, on ne peut être 
totalement négatif’ (Minutes of the 29th Meeting of the Committee of Governors, 10/3/69, Archives ECB). 
In February 1970, a Community Mechanism for Short-term Monetary Assistance was created. 
Conclusion 
In the early years of the Community, the Commission developed very ambitious ideas to push forward 
European integration. In November 1958, Marjolin presented a project for a European Reserve Fund at 
a meeting of the Commission. With the 1962 Action Programme, the Commission pushed for a 
maximal interpretation of the Rome Treaty, calling for economic and monetary union, a medium-term 
policy for the Community, and political union. It encountered heavy resistance, as both France and 
Germany were against such a broad transfer of sovereignty. Moreover, the idea of programming was 
taboo for Erhard, the German economics minister. 
The 1969 Barre Memorandum was much more modest and pragmatic. It proposed a double line of 
action: both short-term and medium-term policy coordination to correct economic imbalances, and a 
Community mechanism for monetary cooperation to alleviate pressures on foreign exchange markets. 
The modesty of the Barre Memorandum contrasts with the ambitions of the Hague Summit, where 
new political leaders (Brandt and Pompidou) set the tone for a ‘great leap forward’. However, the 
plans for EMU did not get very far in the 1970s, as the fundamental underlying factors had not 
changed very much. Gaullist resistance against supranational European institutions quickly mounted. 
Moreover, the international environment was not very favourable with the breakdown of the Bretton-
Woods system and the first oil shock. In this climate policy divergencies increased, leading to growing 
inflation differences and upheaval on the European exchange markets.  
Economic thought at the Commission was strongly policy oriented, focussing on policy problems 
and issues. Central were economic imbalances in the Community, especially inflation divergencies 
and balance of payments disequilibria as well as exchange rate changes. The 1958 project for a 
European Reserve Fund was inspired by the quite dramatic economic imbalances in France. The 1961 
exchange rate realignment was one of the elements behind the plan for monetary union in the Second 
Action Programme. The French economic imbalances after May 1968, when France used the 
safeguard clauses, were a driving factor behind the Barre Memorandum. 
In its analysis, the Commission always focussed on the effects on European integration. In doing 
so, the Commission took both a defensive perspective, focussed on preserving the ‘acquis 
communautaire’ and especially avoiding recourse to the safeguard clauses, as well as a more pro-
active view, with the aim of stimulating the process of European integration. From an analytical point 
                                                      
28    The analysis has certain similarities with the IMF analysis of ‘real effective exchange rates indices’ (cf. Polak, 
1995: 742). For a more detailed analysis of these issues, accession to Commission documents is necessary. Macroeconomic and Monetary Thought at the European Commission in the 1960s 
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of view, the Commission focussed on the linkages and interdependencies between the Member States 
and the compatibility of policies. Gradually, a typical Commission analysis developed, based on a 
blending of German convergence ideas with the French medium-term approach. 
In the monetary area, the focus of the Commission was on the internal dynamics of the process of 
European integration, with the need for improved monetary cooperation to preserve the common 
market and the Common Agricultural Policy. This contrasted with the analysis of the central bankers, 
who took the larger international monetary system as the framework for their analysis. 
One can also witness the ascension of the Commission as an actor in the monetary field. In the 
Rome Treaty, the role of the Commission in the monetary area was limited. During the 1960s the 
influence of the Commission has been increasing. In 1964, with the creation of the Committee of 
Governors, the Commission acquired a place in the central bankers’ Club. In 1970, Barre succeeded in 
pushing through the creation of a Community Mechanism for Monetary Cooperation against the initial 
reluctance of the central bank governors. 
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Annex 1 - List of Persons Interviewed
∗ 
Jean-Paul Abraham (B), European Coal and Steel Community (6-6-2000) 
Michel Albert (F), Director DG II (9-11-2000) 
Raymond Barre (F), Vice-President of the Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs (6-12-2001) 
Georges Berthoin (F), Chef de cabinet of J. Monnet (30-10-2002) 
Daniel Cardon (B), Chef de cabinet of A. Coppé (15-5-2001) 
Roland de Kergorlay (F), Secretary of the Monetary Committee (27-11-2001) 
Jean Flory (F), Chef de cabinet of R. Marjolin (5-12-2001) 
Franz Froschmaier (D), Advisor to H. Von der Groeben and W. Haferkamp (16-7-1997) 
Leonhard Gleske (D), Director DG II (18-12-2001) 
Andreas Kees (D), DG II (28-11-2001) 
Manfred Lahnstein (D), Advisor to W. Haferkamp (11-6-2002) 
André Louw (B), DG II (22-8-1997, 24-7-2001) 
Pierre Millet (F), Director DG II (20-2-2003) 
Bernhard Molitor (D), Director DG II (8-3-2001) 
Jean-Claude Morel (F), Head of Unit DG II (17-8-2000, 5-11-2000) 
François-Xavier Ortoli (F), Director-General DG III (4-12-2001) 
Jean-Claude Paye (F), Chef de cabinet of R. Barre (23-3-2001, 8-1-2003) 
Giovanni Ravasio (I), DG II (10-4-2002) 
Ludwig Schubert (D), DG II (25-8-2000, 25-4-2001) 
Umberto Stefani (I), Assistant to the Director-General, DG II (31-10-2001) 
Roland Tavitian (F), Director DG II (14-11-2003) 
Robert Toulemon (F), Chef de cabinet of R. Marjolin (23-1-2002) 
Paul van den Bempt (B), DG II (5-6-1997) 
Hans von der Groeben (D), Member of the Commission, Competition Policy (23-7-2001) 
Manfred Wegner (D), DG II (2-9-1997) 
Gerard Wissels (N), Advisor to D. Spierenburg, Director DG II (10-1-2003, 18-3-2003) 
                                                      
∗  Function relating to this paper and date of the interview. Ivo Maes 
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Annex 2 - Main Events 
1958  January  EEC and EAEC Treaties take effect 
  December  The EEC countries (and four other ones) restore external convertibility  
Devaluation of the French franc (by 14.8 pct.) 
1961  March  Revaluation of the German mark and Dutch guilder (by 5 pct.) 
  July  United Kingdom requests accession negotiations  
  November  France presents the ‘Fouchet Plan’ 
1962  January  CAP (a single market for agricultural products) is created 
  October  Commission Action Programme for Stage 2 
1964  April-May  Establishment of the Committee of Governors, the Committee on Medium-
term Economic Policy and the Budgetary Policy Committee 
1965  June  Empty chair policy by France 
1966 January  Luxembourg  compromise 
1967  November  Devaluation of Sterling (by 14.3 pct.) 
1968  June  France takes safeguard measures for balance of payments crisis 
  November  Group of Ten agrees on support arrangement for the French franc 
 
1969  February  Commission Memorandum (Plan Barre) 
  August  Devaluation of the French franc (by 11.1 pct.) 
  September  Floating of the German mark 
  October  Revaluation of the German mark (by 9.3 pct.) 
  December  The Hague Summit 
Source: Vanthoor, 1999. 